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THE FERES DOCTRINE
The Federal Tort Claims Act' allows citizens to sue the United
States government for damages on a negligence cause of action.
2
Most of the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals' recent decisions inter-
preting the Act involve an application of established legal principles,
rather than the development of new law. In the area of the Feres doc-
trine, however, the Eighth Circuit formulated a new analysis.3 This
survey will examine the three recent cases 4 in which the Eighth Cir-
cuit interpreted the Feres doctrine.
I. ORIGIN OF THE FERES DOCTRINE
The Feres doctrine creates an exception to the government's liabil-
ity under the Federal Tort Claims Act in cases where military person-
nel are injured while on military duty.5 The doctrine developed out
of a legislative exception that denies military personnel a right to sue
the United States government where the claim arises "out of the
combatant activities of the military or naval forces, or the Coast
Guard, during time of war." 6
At common law, the government was immune from tort liability
based on a negligence claim.7 By enacting the Federal Tort Claims
Act,8 the United States government voluntarily subjected itself to
tort liability, virtually waiving sovereign immunity. Under the Fed-
eral Tort Claims Act, however, the United States government did not
waive its sovereign immunity for claims arising out of combatant ac-
tivities during time of war. 9 This exception was judicially expanded
1. Ch. 171, 62 Stat. 982 (1948) (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. §§ 291, 1346,
1402, 2401, 2402, 2412, 2671-80 (1982)).
2. The Act confers district court jurisdiction "over claims for money damages
against the United States founded on negligence." Feres v. United States, 340 U.S.
135, 138 (1950).
3. Brown v. United States, 739 F.2d 362 (8th Cir. 1984), petitionfor cert. filed, No.
84-636, 53 U.S.L.W. 3438, (U.S. Dec. 12, 1984).
4. Lampitt v. United States, 753 F.2d 702 (8th Cir. 1985); Stubbs v. United
States, 744 F.2d 58 (8th Cir. 1984); Brown, 739 F.2d 362.
5. Feres, 340 U.S. 135; see also Laswell v. Brown, 683 F.2d 261, 265 (8th Cir.
1982) (Feres doctrine applied in case of a willful act); Note, Federal Tort Claims Act:
Anderson v. United States: The Feres Doctrine and "Activity Incident to Service, " 17
CREIGHTON L. REV. 1391 (1984).
6. 28 U.S.C. § 2680().
7. Feres, 340 U.S. at 139-40.
8. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2671-80.
9. Id. § 26800). The Supreme Court in Feres stated that the statute implied that
claims arising from noncombatant activities in peacetime were not barred. Feres, 340
U.S. at 138.
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in a series of decisions outlining the Feres doctrine. The doctrine was
first articulated in the 1950 United States Supreme Court decision of
Feres v. United States. 10 In Feres, the Court refused to extend the Fed-
eral Tort Claims Act to three claimants who, while on noncombatant
active duty, had been injured through the negligence of others."
The Court declared that there was no government liability for "inju-
ries to servicemen where the injuries arise out of or are in the course
of activity incident to service."'
2
10. 340 U.S. 135, 146 (1950).
11. Id. at 138. Feres was a consolidation of three cases: Feres, Jefferson v. United
States, and United States v. Griggs. In Feres, the negligence occurred when Feres was
quartered in barracks that the army knew to be unsafe. The barracks caught fire, and
Feres was killed. The executor of Feres' estate brought a negligence action against
the United States government to recover for injuries resulting in the serviceman's
death. Id. at 136-37.
In Jefferson, the plaintiff had an abdominal operation while in the army. When the
plaintiff had a subsequent operation after his discharge, a U.S. Army towel, 30 inches
long and 18 inches wide, was found in his body. The plaintiff asserted that the army
surgeon who performed the first operation was negligent. Id. at 137.
In the Griggs case, the executor of Griggs' estate claimed that the negligence of
army surgeons caused the decedent's death. Id.
12. Id. The Supreme Court found no basis at law for allowing "a soldier to re-
cover for negligence, against. . . the Government he is serving." Id. at 141. Conse-
quently, the Court refused to find government liability absent express legislative
intent that such liability be imposed. Id. at 144.
The Court limited the application of the Feres doctrine in Brooks v. United States,
337 U.S. 48 (1949). In Brooks, two brothers, both servicemen, were riding in a car
with their father when they were hit by an army truck negligently driven by a civilian
employee of the army. One brother was killed and the other passengers were badly
injured. Id. The Brooks Court found government liability because the two servicemen
were not on duty and the accident was not related to their military status. Id. at 52.
The Court stated "we are dealing with an accident which had nothing to do with the
Brooks brothers' army careers, injuries not caused by their service except in the
sense that all human events depend on what has already transpired." Id. The Court
concluded that the Federal Tort Claims Act's failure to specifically exclude the claims
of military personnel indicated the congressional intent to allow their claims. See id.
at 51, 52.
The Supreme Court later refined the legal theory of Feres in United States v. Brown,
248 U.S. 110 (1954). In Brown, the Supreme Court had to choose between applying
the Feres or the Brooks standard. Brown, 348 U.S. 111. In Brown, the plaintiff had
undergone knee operations performed by the Veterans Administration after he had
been discharged from the army. During one of the operations, a misapplied tourni-
quet caused serious permanent damage to his leg. Id. at 110-11. The Court specifi-
cally distinguished Brown from Feres on the basis that Brown's "injury was not
incurred while . . . [he] was on active duty or subject to military discipline" and that
the negligent act giving rise to the injury was not incident to military service. Id. at
112-13.
The Supreme Court reaffirmed the Feres doctrine and its underlying reasoning in
Stencel Aero Engineering Corp. v. United States, 431 U.S. 667 (1977) and extended the
Feres doctrine to bar a government contractor's indemnity claim against the govern-
ment. Id. at 667. The Stencel Court stated, "the right of a third party to recover in an
indemnity action against the United States . . .must be held limited by the rationale
1132 [Vol. I11
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II. RECENT EIGHTH CIRCUIT CASES
A. Brown v. United States
In Brown v. United States, 13 Della Brown, mother and conservator of
Dan Briscoe, brought an action on behalf of her son.' 4 Dan Briscoe,
a Black private in the Nebraska National Guard, was at Fort Gordon,
Georgia, for his federally required annual training exercises. 15 Dur-
ing his stay there, Briscoe was subjected to racial insults, threats, and
ridicule by other guardsmen.16 Briscoe claimed that on Memorial
Day, 1976, while he was on holiday non-duty status, he attended a
party held by members of the Nebraska and Mississippi National
Guards.17 Briscoe contended that at this party, several members of
the Nebraska and Mississippi National Guards who were under the
influence of alcohol and drugs staged a mock lynching of Briscoe. t8
They led him to believe he was being taken by a lynch mob, and they
placed a noose around his neck.19 Briscoe returned to the barracks,
obviously shaken by the incident.20 Although the National Guard
conducted an investigation of the incident,21 Briscoe indicated that
he was not interested in making a formal complaint. Briscoe did,
however, request pay, medical benefits, and an interview with a race
relations officer.22
Briscoe's requests received immediate attention.2 3 Della Brown
contended that, although her son received the attention he re-
quested, he entered a period of deep depression after the lynching
incident. 24 Briscoe's depression continued until January 12, 1977,
of Feres where the injured party is a serviceman." Id. at 674; see also Chappell v. Wal-
lace, 103 S. Ct. 2362 (1983).
Apparently, Congress has also acquiesced to the Court's interpretation of the
Federal Tort Claims Act, since there has been no congressional effort to correct the
Supreme Court's development of the Feres exception. See Seidelson, Tort Claims Act:
New Insight Into An Old Problem, I HOFsTRA L. REV. 629, 639 (1983).
13. 739 F.2d 362 (8th Cir. 1984).
14. Id. at 363.
15. Id. at 364.
16. Id. On one occasion, someone had placed a hangman's noose with the in-
scription "KKK" on Briscoe's bunk. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id. Briscoe claimed he was lifted off the ground. Id.
20. When Briscoe returned to the barracks he struck the barracks wall with his
hand, put his hand through a glass window, and overturned several beds. Id
21. Id. The commanding officer conducted interviews and took sworn state-
ments from all persons involved in the incident. He concluded that the mock hang-
ing was an ill-advised prank in which Briscoe had voluntarily participated. Id.
22. Id. at 364.
23. Id.
24. Id.
1985] 1133
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when he shot himself in the head, causing severe injury.25
Della Brown claimed that the United States government was liable
in tort because the base commander and his assistants allowed the
lynching incident to take place26 and because several noncommis-
sioned officers of Briscoe's military unit participated in the hang-
ing.27 In addition, she contended that several superior officers failed
to detect racial problems that culminated in the hanging incident,
provided inadequate supervision, and "purposefully failed to prop-
erly investigate the incident."28
The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals examined Brown's claims
under the Feres doctrine and relied upon the following rationales tra-
ditionally offered in support of the Feres doctrine:29
1) the distinctly federal relationship between the United States
government and its military personnel, since members of the
military may be stationed in any number of places;3O
2) the availability of alternative compensation, regardless of the
government's negligence;31
3) the potential effect of civil suits on military discipline.32
The Brown court found the third factor most compelling.SS In view
of these rationales supporting the use of the Feres doctrine, the court
developed a two-prong test to determine whether the Feres doctrine
bars a suit brought by military personnel.
The first prong of the Eighth Circuit's test is whether there is a
relevant relationship between the service member's activity and the
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 365.
30. Id. The Feres Court found that the relationship between the United States
and its military is unique because all aspects of the relationship derive from federal
sources and are governed by federal authority. Feres, 340 U.S. at 143-45. The Feres
Court stated that this relationship becomes especially important because the Federal
Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b), provides that the law of the location of the act
or omission governs liability. Id. at 142. This means that state law would apply to
cases involving servicemens' injuries, with potentially divergent results. See id.
31. Brown, 739 F.2d at 365. The presence of an alternate compensation system
does not really explain or justify the Feres doctrine, but merely "makes the effect of
the doctrine more palatable." Id. (quoting Hunt v. United States, 636 F.2d 580, 589
(D.C. Cir. 1980)).
32. Brown, 739 F.2d 365.
33. See id. The Brown Court stated:
The peculiar and special relationship of the soldier to his superiors, the ef-
fects of the maintenance of such suits on discipline, and the extreme results
that might obtain if suits under the tort claims act were allowed for negli-
gent orders given or negligent acts committed in the course of military duty,
led the Court to read that Act as excluding claims of that character.
Brown, 348 U.S. at 112.
1134 [Vol. I11
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military service.34 The court examined three factors that the Eighth
Circuit has considered important in the past.35 These factors are the
duty status of the service member,36 the location of the injury,37 and
the nature of the activity.3 8
The court distinguished Briscoe's duty status at the time of the
incident from the duty status of others whose claims have tradition-
ally been barred by the Feres doctrine.S9 The court noted that Bris-
coe was off duty for the entire Memorial Day weekend and that no
military activities were planned for the weekend.40 The court only
briefly discussed the second factor, location of the injury.41 In Trog-
lia v. United States,42 the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that re-
covery is generally barred under Feres if the injury occurred on a
military base. 43 The Brown court refused to adopt this rigid stan-
dard.44 Eighth Circuit cases also tend to deny recovery where the
injury took place on a military base.45 The Brown court held, how-
ever, that the location of the injury is merely a factor to be
considered.46
In discussing the third factor-the nature of the activity-the court
was concerned with "whether the activity out of which the action
arose served some military purpose or mission." 47 The court found
that in the case of Briscoe's mock hanging, there was no conceivable
military purpose involved.48
The second prong of the court's analysis consisted of an evalua-
tion of the detrimental effect a court action would have on military
discipline.49 The court asserted that military discipline would be un-
dermined if officers were exposed to "personal liability at the hands
of those they are charged to command."50 The court found that
34. 739 F.2d at 367.
35. Id.
36. Id. The duty status was framed in terms of how much control the military
had over the individual at the time of the incident. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 368. The nature of the activity factor measures the relationship be-
tween the injury and the service member's military duty.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Troglia v. United States, 602 F.2d 1334, 1337 (9th Cir. 1979).
43. Brown, 739 F.2d at 367.
44. Id. The court concluded that the rigid test is in part a "substitute for analysis
of whether the serviceman was injured in an activity incident to his service in the
military." Id. at 367-68 (citing Troglia, 602 F.2d at 1338).
45. See Brown, 739 F.2d at 367.
46. Id. at 368.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 368-69.
50. Id. (quoting Chappell 103 S. Ct. at 2367).
1985]
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Brown's claim against the various defendants for failure to prevent
the hanging incident and for failure to properly investigate the inci-
dent constituted a direct attack on the military disciplinary struc-
ture. 5' The Feres doctrine will not permit a court to second-guess
military decisions regarding the investigation of a disciplinary
matter.52
Although the Brown court found that the Feres doctrine did not al-
low a tort action against the officers who failed to prevent the hang-
ing incident or those who did not properly investigate the matter,53
it did find that Brown had a cause of action against those who were
actually involved in the incident.54 The court reasoned that the pres-
ervation of discipline would not be furthered by protecting the per-
petrators of such an undisciplined act, the occurrence of which
indicated a total breakdown of discipline.55 For that reason, the
court found that "Briscoe's claim against the participants in the affair
is not barred by the Feres doctrine."56
B. Stubbs v. United States
In Stubbs v. United States,5 7 the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals ap-
plied the test it developed in Brown to determine the applicability of
the Feres doctrine. The suit was brought by the administrator of the
estate of Dawn Stubbs against the United States government under
the Federal Tort Claims Act.58 The district court dismissed the ac-
tion pursuant to Feres, and the sole issue before the Eighth Circuit
was whether dismissal on that basis was proper.59
In Stubbs, the estate of Dawn Stubbs sought damages from the
United States and an army drill sergeant, 60 alleging wrongful death
by sexual harrassment and emotional distress. 61 In December of
1982, Drill Sergeant Sookdeo asked Private Stubbs to meet him at
the latrine. She met him at the latrine as requested, assuming the
sergeant would order some last-minute cleaning before she left for
the holidays. When she arrived at the latrine, however, Sergeant
51. Id. at 369.
52. Id.; see also Miller v. United States, 643 F.2d 481, 494 (8th Cir. 1981) (en
banc).
53. Brown, 739 F.2d at 369.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. 744 F.2d 58 (8th Cir. 1984).
58. Id. at 59. The suit alleged wrongful death by sexual harassment and emo-
tional distress. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id. Both Private Stubbs and Sergeant Sookdeo were on duty at the time of
the incident. Id. at 60.
1136 [Vol. I11
6
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 11, Iss. 4 [1985], Art. 10
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol11/iss4/10
FERES DOCTRINE
Sookdeo accosted her and told her that if she would have sex with
him he could make the remaining six weeks of her training easier.
He cautioned that if she refused to have sex with him, he would make
training rougher for her.62 Sergeant Sookdeo touched her inti-
mately, but she refused his advances. 63 The next day, Private Stubbs
left the base for the holidays. 64 Throughout the holidays she repeat-
edly told her sister how upset she was about the incident on the
base.65 Private Stubbs had been raped several years earlier. The in-
cident on the base and the fear of another potential forced sexual
encounter disturbed Private Stubbs very much. 66 She repeatedly
told her sister of the incident and explained that the army would la-
bel her a troublemaker if she complained.67 On the morning that
Private Stubbs was supposed to return to the base, her sister saw her
sitting in the car clutching a shotgun. Before her sister could stop
her, Private Stubbs killed herself with a shot to the forehead.68
In deciding whether the Fetes doctrine should bar this claim, the
court relied on the analytical framework established in Brown: "(1)
whether there is a relevant relationship between the service mem-
ber's activity and the military service, and (2) whether military disci-
pline will be impeded if the challenged conduct is litigated in a civil
action."69
Under the first prong of this analysis, the court again used the
three-part test articulated in Brown. 70 The first two factors, duty sta-
tus of the personnel and location of the injury, weighed in favor of
applying Feres, since both Private Stubbs and Sergeant Sookdeo were
on duty at the time of the incident and the harrassment took place on
the Fort Leonard Wood military post. 71 The court found that the
third factor, relationship of the activity to some military purpose or
mission, 72 militated in favor of application of the Feres doctrine, since
Stubbs thought that she was reporting for latrine duty. Her belief
was sufficient to establish a relevant relationship between her activity
and her military service.73
62. Id. at 59.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id. This fear was probably intensified by her belief that her military superiors
were aware of the sexual harassment of enlisted female personnel on the base, yet did
nothing to prevent it. See id.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 60 (quoting Brown, 739 F.2d 362).
70. Id.; Brown, 739 F.2d at 367-68. The test involved duty status of the service
member, and the location and nature of the injury. Id.
71. 744 F.2d at 60.
72. Id.
73. Id. Although the court admitted that the sexual harassment served no mili-
1985] 1137
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In looking at the second prong of the analysis established in Brown,
the court found "that military discipline would be impaired if Stubbs
were allowed to maintain the suit against the United States, since the
trial would undoubtedly question the interaction between an officer
and his subordinate." 74 The sexual harassment claim, as well as
Stubbs' claim that the United States created an atmosphere which
ultimately led to her suicide by allowing sexual harassment to take
place, were found to go directly to the heart of the military decision-
making and discipline process. 75 For that reason, the court found
that these inquiries into the incident were barred by the Feres
doctrine.76
C. Lampitt v. United States
The Eighth Circuit most recently affirmed the Feres doctrine in
Lampitt v. United States. 7 7 In Lampitt, a medical malpractice case, the
court affirmed the district court's decision barring a serviceman's ac-
tion against the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act.78
In Lampitt, the plaintiff claimed that he had requested that Navy
physicians perform surgery on him only if assisted by a civilian doc-
tor.79 The plaintiff brought an action under the Federal Tort Claims
Act arguing that the surgery was negligently performed because the
civilian physician did not supervise or participate.8 0
The Eighth Circuit evaluated Lampitt's claim without referring to
either of its two most recent decisions.81 The court did not apply the
two-prong test it developed in BrownS2 and applied in Stubbs.83
Rather, the court analyzed the case in view of the medical malprac-
tice cases that accompanied the Feres case.84 In re-examining these
medical malpractice cases, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals con-
cluded that "[t]he courts have adhered to the view that surgery on
tary purpose, it found that the duty status and location of the incident factors were
sufficient to outweigh this third factor. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 61.
":76. Id.
77. 753 F.2d 702 (8th Cir. 1985).
78. Id. at 703.
79. Id. The plaintiff insisted on and was assured of a civilian doctor's supervi-
sion. Id.
80. id
81. Id. at 702. The court made no mention of Brown or Stubbs.
82. See supra notes 35-39 and accompanying text.
83. See supra notes 69-76 and accompanying text.
84. 753 F.2d at 703. Feres was consolidated with theJefferson and Griggs cases. See
supra note 11 and accompanying text. The Lampitt court compared Lampitt's posi-
tion to that of Brown in United States v. Brown, 348 U.S. 110 (1952), but distinguished
Lampitt on the basis of duty status, since Brown was a veteran and no longer under
the control of the military. Id.
1138 [Vol. I11
8
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 11, Iss. 4 [1985], Art. 10
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol11/iss4/10
FERES DOCTRINE
servicemen by military doctors is included within the Feres doc-
trine."85 The court failed, however, to analyze the relationship be-
tween the injury and Lampitt's duty status. This easy rejection of
Lampitt's claim is somewhat difficult to reconcile with the court's ex-
tensive analysis in Brown.86
CONCLUSION
How the Eighth Circuit will interpret the Feres doctrine in the fu-
ture is uncertain. Although Brown articulates a new test for the rela-
tionship between injury and military duty, that test does not appear
to make the outcome of a suit by servicemen more predictable than it
was before Brown. The weight accorded to the various factors taken
into consideration is not clearly set out, and the court did not clarify
or refine the test in the two cases subsequent to Brown.
The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals found that a mock lynching
was far enough removed from the interest in military discipline to be
exempt from the Feres doctrine. Yet, a sexual harassment claim went
directly to the heart of the military decisionmaking process and was
thus intertwined with military discipline. The fact that one of these
incidents occurred on a holiday weekend and the other on the eve-
ning before holiday leave does not distinguish the two. Further-
more, the court failed to explain the negative effect a medical
malpractice action would have on military discipline. In view of the
court's failure to explain how the test articulated in Brown is to be
85. Lampitt, 753 F.2d at 703.
86. There is a line of cases in which the Feres rule was applied because at the time
of injury, the service members enjoyed a recreational benefit because of their military
status. See, e.g., Woodside v. United States, 606 F.2d 134, 142 (6th Cir. 1979) (Air
Force-sponsored flying club); Hass v. United States, 518 F.2d 1138, 1141-42 (4th Cir.
1975) (riding horse rented from military riding stable); Chambers v. United States,
357 F.2d 224, 229 (8th Cir. 1966) (on-base swimming pool used for personal recrea-
tion while not on leave or furlough); Knight v. United States, 361 F. Supp. 708 (W.D.
Tenn. 1972), af'd, 480 F.2d 927 (6th Cir. 1973) (on-base swimming pool). Suits by
active duty service members alleging medical malpractice by military doctors have
also generally been barred by Feres. See, e.g., Harten v. Coons, 502 F.2d 1363, 1364
(10th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 693 (1979); Peluso v. United States, 474 F.2d
605, 606 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 879 (1973); Shultz v. United States, 421 F.2d
170, 172 (5th Cir. 1969).
According to the court in Johnson v. United States, 704 F.2d 1431 (9th Cir.
1983):
The one factor that best explains the results in these cases is that the plain-
tiffs had access to the various recreational and medical benefits only because
of their status as military personnel. Consequently, the injuries suffered
were incident to service because the plaintiffs would not have been privi-
leged to take advantage of the benefits but for their military status.
Id. at 1438-39. The Lampitt court made no mention of this theory when denying
recovery.
1985] 1139
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applied, the test is not as useful as first appears and does little to
clarify the law surrounding the Feres doctrine and its application.
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